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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Putin reacts to bombing 
President Vladimir Putin responded to suicide bombings at a Saturday evening 
concert in Moscow with sympathy and support for the relatives of the dead and 
injured, but did not immediately link the attacks to developments in Chechnya. 
While some Russian officials, including Interior Minister Boris Gryzlov, noted that 
the attacks followed the signing of a decree scheduling Chechen presidential 
elections for October, President Putin chose to refer to the suicide bombers (both 
of whom were killed in the explosions) as "traitors to the nation and murderers." 
(AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, 6 July 03 via Lexis-Nexis) Putin also postponed 
his planned visits to Uzbekistan and Malaysia. As yet, there has been no claim of 
responsibility for the bombings. 
 
Update: At a Monday meeting with his Cabinet, President Putin did place 
responsibility for the attacks squarely on the shoulders of Chechen extremists. 
"They must be plucked out of the basements and caves where they remain 
hiding and destroyed. Their main task is to undermine the process of political 
settlement in Chechnya." (MOSCOW TIMES 8 Jul 03 via Lexis-Nexis) Putin's 
message was, however, focused on the need to protect his version of a political 
end to the Chechen war, rather than an escalation of attacks on Chechnya. 
 
To each election, its own enemy 
In the Autumn of 1999, a series of apartment bombings in Russia were deemed 
the work of Chechen rebels and eradication of these terrorists, wherever they 
might be, was the foundation stone of then Prime Minister Putin's presidential 
election bid. 
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As the next election season gets underway however, there seems to be a sense 
in the Kremlin that the continuing battle in Chechnya has wearied the Russian 
population, which is searching for domestic economic improvements rather than 
tough-sounding military actions. If this theory does hold sway with Kremlin 
campaign planners, it may explain why Putin's recent trip to Britain underplayed 
disagreements on Iraq, highlighting instead Russia's economic ties to the West, 
as well as the fanfare attending Putin's recently announced intention to double 
Russia's GDP. 
 
It may also set off alarms for the less well-connected, and more politically active, 
among Russia's oligarchs. The recent arrest of a major shareholder in, and close 
associate of the power behind, Yukos oil company appears as a winning tactic 
supporting the strong economy (weed out corruption) strategy. Platon Lebedev, 
the second-largest shareholder in Yukos, was arrested and is being held on fraud 
charges dating back to the 1990's. (MOSCOW TIMES 4 July 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
Another Yukos executive, Alexei Pichugin, was charged last week in connection 
with two murders committed last year. The investigation of Yukos officials, and 
Lebedev in particular, has been perceived by most analysts as an attack on 
Yukos CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who has used his money and influence to 
back both liberal political parties, such as Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces, 
and to counterbalance that effort with support, through the Yukos board, for the 
Communist Party (theoretically, hewing to the time-honored tradition of backing 
both sides to ensure parliamentary support for Yukos however the actual 
elections shake out). 
 
As Liliya Shevtsova from Moscow's Carnegie Center notes, "This is a definite 
warning to Khodorkovsky to keep out of politics, if he does not want to share the 
fate of Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky." (FINANCIAL TIMES, 4 Jul 03 
via Lexis-Nexis) 
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The use of the power ministries to investigate the economically powerful for 
political motives may not play well with the world's economic analysts, and 
indeed may curb any foreign enthusiasm for investment in Russia, but these are 
moves aimed at a decidedly domestic audience. If Putin can punish the greedy 
businessmen who 'profiteered' in the market hi-jinx of the 1990's and be seen as 
cracking down on economic corruption, he may have a winning way in the 
coming parliamentary and presidential elections (without need of the potent 
levers of electoral control through FAPSI and the other security services). Now, if 
only this pesky Chechen problem would go away…. 
 
More personnel moves in the Government 
The inclusion of the former Governor of St. Petersburg, Aleksandr Yakovlev, in 
Prime Minister Kasyanov's Government and the transfer of Igor Shuvalov to the 
Kremlin (See N.I.S. Observed 25 Jun 03) has apparently prompted a 
restructuring of the Council of Ministers and their staffs. 
 
Yakovlev takes over the housing and utilities portfolios from Deputy P.M. Viktor 
Khristenko, who picks up the Fuel and Energy sector and oversees cooperation 
with the European Union, reform of monopolies and various other sectors. 
(IZVESTIYA, 2 Jul 03; What the Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
There are also significant changes to the Ministerial Staff, including the addition 
of two more deputies to the Chief of Staff, bringing the total number of deputies 
to eight. Alexandra Levitskaya, former First Deputy Head of the Government 
Apparat, will join Shuvalov in the Kremlin Administration. (IZVESTIYA, Ibid.) 
 
In other personnel moves: Gadzhimagomed Apiovich Gadzhimagomedov was 
appointed to head up the Government Staff for Relations with the Federal 
Assembly, Public and Religious Organizations, replacing Farit Mubarakshovich 
Mukhametshin; Presidential Adviser A.G. Burutin has been named to the 
Government Commission on Military-Industrial Issues; and Yuri Ivanovich 
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Moskaltsov has retired as Deputy Chair of the State Committee for Fishing. 
(ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 26 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0626 via World News 
Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Dullea 
 
Putin cashes in on visit to the UK 
In the month of June the Kremlin put on a foreign policy blitz with a two-fold goal 
of securing respect from the West and showing Russian voters how President 
Putin can bring home money to Mother Russia. The foreign minister toured Asia, 
Yevgeni Primakov signed a trade deal with the government of Laos, and Deputy 
Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko welcomed the Japanese foreign minister in 
Vladivostok. The Russian Minister of Defense, Sergei Ivanov, met with NATO 
and the Americans about future defense cooperation, including a joint US-Russia 
missile defense exercise, (WWW.STRANA.RU via RFE/RL Vol. 4, No. 25, 24 Jun 
03) and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov hosted his French counterpart, 
Jean Raffarin, in Moscow. The main thrust of the foreign charm offensive, 
however, was President Putin’s four-day visit to the United Kingdom where he 
was accompanied by a large contingent of Russian corporate energy 
representatives and his foreign and energy ministers. 
 
The pomp and pageantry surrounding the visit was notable and important but not 
the highlight of the event. Certainly the royal reception of President Putin will be 
viewed by some as Britain’s acceptance of Russia – a reprehensible thought to 
many Britons familiar with Russia’s record in Chechnya (THE INDEPENDENT, 
24 Jun 03 via Johnson’s Russia List #7238, 25 Jun 03), but even more important 
for Russians at home to see how President Putin has raised the nation’s 
international status. It also serves as an opportunity to demonstrate to other E.U. 
and western nations how the British leader respects Russia, even after the 
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souring of relations over the Iraq debate. Although it is clear that the visit was not 
a response to recent events [after all, such state visits are coordinated about two 
years in advance (THE TIMES, 23 Jun 03 via Johnson’s Russia List #7236, 24 
Jun 03)], the trip was still a well-aimed Russian foreign policy maneuver with a 
country of key strategic interest. 
 
Cementing Russia’s relationship with Great Britain at this juncture may create the 
double byproduct of helping to stabilize relations with the U.S. and the E.U. 
Events that confirmed such aims included: the signing of an agreement by the 
U.K. and Russian foreign ministers on financing measures for the elimination of 
weapons of mass destruction; a tour with the Duke of York of a Russian warship 
on a goodwill visit to Britain during which the escorting admiral emphasized the 
Russian Navy’s recent participation in the NATO exercise BALTOPS, thereby 
underscoring Russia’s cooperation with the Alliance (ITAR-TASS, 26 Jun 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003 0626 via World News Connection); and discussions between 
Putin and Prime Minister Blair on sweeping aside disagreements over Iraq, on 
the status of Iran’s nuclear program, and on continued cooperation in fighting 
terrorism. 
 
Regardless of the significance of the domestic and international perspectives of 
these political highlights, the real aim of Putin’s U.K. visit was far simpler: to get 
credit for bringing home money. In a radio interview on 26 June (MAYAK RADIO, 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0626 via World News Connection) Andrei Kokoshin, Russia’s 
former Security Council Secretary and Chairman of the Duma Committee on the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, described the economic significance of 
the visit: "[London] is a place where continental Europe and the United States 
meet, and now it is the place for contacts with big business which we need so 
badly. I mean the big business of the Euro-Atlantic zone." President Putin 
underscored Britain’s current standing as the world’s third largest investor in 
Russia behind Germany and Cyprus – a position which may improve pending 
substantial investments by British Petroleum and Shell – and noted the 
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burgeoning trade between Britain and Russia which almost doubled in the first 
two months of 2003. (ITAR-TASS, 26 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0626 via World 
News Connection) 
 
Having arrived well-armed with a delegation of Russian energy sector 
representatives, President Putin, in between carriage rides and banquets with the 
Queen, conducted business that may promise long term profits for Russia. The 
forum for most of the business meetings was the International Energy 
Conference which Blair and Putin officially opened in London. One result of the 
proceedings was a supplement to the 1999 agreement on cooperation in the 
peaceful use of atomic power which envisages work to scrap nuclear submarines 
and spent nuclear fuel in Russia’s northwest. The Conference also produced 
bilateral communiqués on energy and economic cooperation as well as a 
discussion between Blair and Putin on the need to step up cooperation in the 
high-tech field. (RTR RUSSIA TV, 26 Jun 03; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) 
 
Oil and gas-related announcements, however, stood out as the most significant 
of the business deals. During the conference, Gazprom’s CEO Alexei Miller 
announced that his company would supply Britain with one billion cubic meters of 
gas in 2003, up 270 million cubic meters from last year. Miller noted the mutually-
beneficial relationship between Europe and Gazprom, as 70% of the company’s 
exports go to the European market and Gazprom’s sales to Europe make up a 
third of the total gas imports in the region. Miller pushed for long term contracts to 
ensure energy security and stability and for the financing of gas transport 
projects to enhance the safety of energy supplies. (INTERFAX, 26 Jun 2003; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0626 via World News Connection) 
 
During the visit, British Minister of Trade and Industry, Stephen Timms, and the 
Russian Minister of Energy, Igor Yusufov, signed a bilateral memorandum on the 
Northern European gas pipeline project. Putin and Blair attended the signing 
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ceremony. The plan involves laying a gas pipeline along the bottom of the Baltic 
Sea, across Germany and the Netherlands to the coast of Britain. Putin 
supported the plan stating, "I am positive the implementation of the project will 
ensure stability and reliability of the deliveries of [Russian energy] to Britain and 
continental Europe… for dozens of years…at reasonable prices." (ITAR-TASS, 
26 Jun 2003; FBIS-SOV-2003-0626 via World News Connection) The project, 
which is valued at about seven billion dollars, is attracting the attention of 
Britain’s Shell Oil company, Germany’s Ruhrgas, as well as Swedish and Dutch 
companies, and is scheduled to begin operation in 2007. Gazprom, which the 
Russian Ministry of Energy favors to become the pipeline’s chief operator, 
intends to begin developing new gas deposits in Yamal in order to fill the 
pipeline. (ITAR-TASS, 26 Jun 2003; FBIS-SOV-2003-0626 via World News 
Connection) 
 
Coinciding with this drive to encourage the long term sale of Russian petroleum 
to Europe, the Russian Energy Minister told reporters in London that his ministry 
had submitted a draft resolution to the government on the development of a 
feasibility study for the construction of an oil pipeline to Murmansk. Although the 
capacity of the system is still in question (with estimates fluctuating between 50-
60 cubic million tons per annum and 100-120 million cubic tons per annum), the 
minister announced to reporters that the primary consumers of this pipeline’s oil 
would be Western Europe and the United States. (ITAR-TASS, 26 Jun 03; FBIS-
SOV-2003-0626 via World News Connection) 
 
President Putin picked up his most valuable British souvenir on 26 June as he 
and Blair observed the completion of a joint venture agreement between Russia’s 
Tyumen Oil Company (TNK) and British Petroleum (BP). This deal, involving a 
$6.15 billion investment in Russia, will be of significance for the Russian oil 
industry. TNK-BP will have substantial assets in the most important oil-rich 
regions of Russia (800,000 barrels per day in Western Siberia and 370,000 
barrels per day in the Volga-Ural area). At the energy conference, BP's 
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leadership made statements to encourage the Russian delegation, describing 
how it intends to use the "skilled Russian workers" combined with outside 
machinery and methods to achieve optimal efficiency. (ITAR-TASS, 26 Jun 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0626 via World News Connection) 
 
Despite the fact that the final deal fell $3 billion short of the arrangement initially 
announced in February 2003 (RUSSIKA IZVESTIA, 27 Jun 03; What the Papers 
Say via ISI Emerging Markets Database), and an additional 600 million dollars 
short as a result of adjustments concerning TNK’s debt (NEZAVISIMAYA 
GAZETA, 27 Jun 03; What the Papers Say via ISI Emerging Markets Database), 
the TNK-BP venture points not only to the financial advantages for Russia but 
also to the possibility that Russia’s reputation among international investors may 
be improving. TNK board chairman Viktor Vekselberg described the deal as "an 
international recognition of rising stability in Russia and its progress in the [sic] 
economic development." (ITAR-TASS, 26 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0626 via 
World News Connection) 
 
With Russia still smarting from its lost contracts in Iraq, President Putin has 
managed to deflect attention to these new accomplishments in the U.K. In this 
respect his visit to Great Britain can be considered a success, but is he really 
responsible for this success? Putin did not need to have dinner with the Queen in 
order to seal the lucrative financial deals, however Putin’s timely presence in 
Britain, in a coordinated symphony of political and economic measures, gave the 
impression that it was Putin who single-handedly both boosted Russia’s 
international prestige and brought home substantial investment to Russia. It is 
debatable whether these triumphs will provide long term energy-sector financial 
success – already skeptics are predicting the Northern European gas pipeline will 
never be anything more than a paper project (VEDEMOSTI, 27 Jun 03; What the 
Papers Say via ISI Emerging Markets Database) – or whether the historic visit 
might indeed contribute to the soothing of post-Iraq relations with the West, but in 
a political world where perception often rules reality, Putin’s four days in Britain 
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may very well reward him with considerable popular and political support at 
home. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Kate Martin 
 
MEDIA 
Another one bites the dust 
One more independent television station has gone off the air, after quite a fight. 
In a flagrant flouting of authority, Mikhail Lesin’s Press Ministry apparently 
decided that laws protecting the media were meant to be broken, at almost the 
same time that the legislature decided more laws restricting the media were 
needed. The field of independent television options in Russia is now empty. 
 
Although given until mid-June to clear the debts that served as the pretext for the 
closure, TVS was actually taken off the air bit by bit at the beginning of the 
month. A cable company owned by the Moscow city administration began 
disconnecting the channel from the cable network; Mostelekom's general 
director, Aleksandr Makhonov, denied that the motivation was political, pointing 
instead to TVS’ debt as the cause for his company’s actions. (INTERFAX, 3 Jun 
03 via Johnson’s Russia List #7206) He had nothing to say about the continued 
airing of other state-supported stations that owe far more. 
 
The final blow came near midnight on 21 June, when a small sign appeared on 
the station saying "Goodbye! We have been switched off" and was followed by a 
test pattern. The next day, TVS was replaced by a national sports channel called 
Rossiya Sport. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 23 Jun 03 via www.rense.com) 
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This appears to be the end of the saga of the peripatetic journalists who, led by 
Yevgeni Kiselev, began at NTV (leaving in April 2001 when that station was 
subject to a hostile takeover by Gazprom-Media), moved to the Berezovsky-
owned TV-6 (until minority shareholder LUKoil forced that outlet's closure) [THE 
RUSSIA JOURNAL, 30 Nov 01 via America Online (AOL)], and then, as part of a 
consortium, won the tender in June 2002 for TV-6’s license to broadcast as the 
TVS station. Not even the naming of former Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov 
and industrialist Arkadi Volsky, who had joined the TVS Supervisory Council – 
charged with overseeing media ethics as well as preventing "any attempts to 
establish censorship" of TVS programs (RUSSIAN MEDIA BULLETIN, Aug 02 
via www.internews.ru/eim/august2002) – could stop a determined ministry from 
shutting down the station. [Primakov’s inclusion in the consortium was rather 
startling to some analysts who were hesitant to put the former prime minister in 
the pro-press freedom camp; Kiselev, however, went out of his way to assure 
concerned individuals that Primakov "is very sensitive to criticism in the press." 
(RFE/RL, 5 Jun 02)] 
 
According to a press ministry statement, the move was "not an easy one," but the 
authorities had "an obligation to defend the rights of television viewers and 
cannot allow a vacuum to be formed on a central television channel." (BBC 
MONITORING MEDIA SERVICES, 25 Jun 03 via Johnson’s Russia List #7240) 
At least part of the statement was correct: getting the journalists off the air was 
not an easy task. Indeed, the press ministry had to resort to what many are 
classifying as illegal moves to shut down the station. 
 
One senior ministry official, who refused to be identified, asserted that by failing 
to broadcast in Moscow for more than a week, TVS had breached its licensing 
agreement. But Vasily Perfirev, deputy chief of Media-Sotsium, which holds the 
TVS broadcasting license, termed that (at best, disingenuous) explanation 
"absolute stupidity." The highly suspect removal of TVS from the Moscow 
administration-owned cable provider (which has not treated other debtor stations 
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in a similar manner) should not have been cited as cause Perfirev said, since 
"[t]here is no requirement for mandatory broadcasts" in the cities listed in the 
station’s license. Suspicion also rests on the press ministry’s apparently 
intentional disregard of the law, which mandates that television channels can be 
shut down only by court order. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 24 Jun 03 via 
www.themoscowtimes.com) 
 
Such goings on, understandably, have ended the journalists’ fight to broadcast, 
but at least one person, Kiselev, plans to continue his work in another forum. 
 
"If someone seriously asks [me] to become a (parliament) deputy, then I will 
seriously weigh this offer," Kiselev told Ekho Moskvy." This would give me a new 
outlet for airing my views, to criticize the president's decisions...and fight for a 
free media." (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 23 Jun 03 via www.rense.com) 
 
But wait – there’s more 
Meanwhile, journalists who still have a job now have something else to worry 
about – the Federation Council on 25 June passed amendments to the law "On 
the main guarantees to election rights." The original draft of the law had caused 
quite a bit of controversy this spring, and Central Election Commission (CEC) 
chairman Aleksandr Veshnyakov had promised subsequently that the 
amendments would themselves be amended before the second reading in the 
State Duma. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 23 Apr 03) There has been no indication 
that any substantive changes have been made however, and journalists had best 
beware, according to Oleg Panfilov, director of the Center for Extreme 
Journalism, "[e]specially those independent media outlets that try to preserve 
somehow the notion of freedom of speech, that say something during the 
election campaign." Igor Yakovenko, general secretary of the Union of 
Journalists, agreed that only certain companies would feel the effects of the 
amendments. "Only selected media outlets – those that initially are suspected of 
being able to say something ‘wrong’ – will be monitored. There would be no 
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limitations on praising One Russia.... As for TV, everything is all right here: we 
have already received a single picture and single text on all the major issues of 
Russia's life," he said. (EKHO MOSKVY, 1220 GMT, 25 Jun 03; BBC Monitoring 
via Johnson’s Russia List #7240) 
 
Reporters Without Borders warned that the closure of TVS coupled with the new 
amendments "seriously threaten the diversity and freedom of news coverage." 
The ambiguity in terminology contained in the legislation opens the door to 
possible restrictions on media freedom with official sanction, the group said: "The 
term 'electoral propaganda' is not clearly defined and could be construed as 
referring to any article mentioning a candidate. This would drastically curtail 
press coverage during election campaigns." (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 25 
Jun 03 via Johnson’s Russia List #7240) 
 
Not so, according to the CEC chairman. Following passage of the bill, the 
commission met with lawyers of the federal media to discuss the amendments, 
and then met with the media to report that everything was fine. "We have 
demonstrated convincingly that all these innovations are aimed at protecting the 
freedom of speech, promote democracy, just elections, and protect the media 
from attempts to use them in dirty manipulations," Veshnyakov said. (RIA 
NOVOSTI, 27 Jun 03 via Johnson’s Russia List #7242) 
 
LEGISLATURE 
Handy end to an investigation? 
The assassins of Duma Deputy Sergei Yushenkov have been caught, officials 
report, after a two-month investigation. (PRAVDA.ru, 26 Jun 03 via 
english.pravda.ru) Two individuals have been detained on suspicion of killing the 
liberal politician, and, according to Gazeta.Ru sources, one of them has already 
confessed to the crime. (GAZETA.RU, 25 Jun 03 via Johnson’s Russia List 
#7240) Interior Minister Boris Gryzlov subsequently issued more details, 
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including that among the trigger men was a recently released drug dealer. 
(izvestia.ru, 25 Jun 03 via RFE/RL Newsline) 
 
But Muscovites might want to hold off on breathing that sigh of relief, since the 
rest of the report is somewhat questionable. While police say they were working 
on a search warrant to arrest the suspects, for example, the chairman of the 
court that purportedly issued the warrant has said no such warrant existed. 
(gazeta.ru, 25 Jun 03 via Johnson’s Russia List #7240) Moreover, it is still 
unclear why anyone would want to murder Yushenkov. According to an 
unidentified source in law enforcement, officials have decided that the motive 
was not political. "For the time being, a version saying that the assassination was 
committed because of financial relations is the priority one," the source said. 
(PRAVDA.RU, 26 Jun 03 via english.pravda.ru) That notion was 
unceremoniously dumped, however, when a third man was arrested allegedly for 
ordering the hit, Mikhail Kodanev, a high-level official in the Liberal Russia faction 
that had split from the original party (in large part because leaders, including 
Yushenkov, had ousted oligarch Boris Berezovsky). (www.newsru.com, 26 Jun 
03 via RFE/RL Newsline) Indeed, the climate between the two factions of Liberal 
Russia is so tense that a spokesman for Yushenkov’s faction, Yuri Nisnevich, 
characterized the investigators’ theory as "probable." Berezovsky, on the other 
hand, likened the arrest of his deputy to Soviet-era political repressions. (BBC 
NEWS, 1212 GMT, 26 Jun 03 via www.bbc.co.uk) 
 
Despite Nisnevich’s statement, it is difficult to determine what possible benefit 
there would be from such a move. True, Yushenkov led the rival faction of Liberal 
Russia, and his death (along with the earlier assassination of his deputy) could 
end that group’s political chances. But those chances were not strong to begin 
with: Liberal Russia is unlikely to obtain the requisite number of votes during the 
December elections to sit in the Duma, schism or no schism. Then again, the 
Berezovsky camp has rarely relied on clear assessments of the situation before 
making moves – witness earlier attempts to form a coalition with a balking 
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Communist Party. It will be interesting to watch how the evidence for this case 
plays out, and perhaps more importantly, whether the evidence will be made 
public. 
 
Who else had motivation to remove the deputy from the scene? Yushenkov was 
widely known in political circles as a reliable liberal. He condemned the first 
Chechen war as early as December 1994. (Pravda.ru, 18 Apr 03 via 
english.pravda.ru) He staunchly refused to join the Union of Right Forces, 
unwilling to accept compromises or Boris Nemtsov’s leadership. (THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 18 Jun 03) He was a well-known defender of media freedom, and a 
vocal critic of security services that might be straying from the bounds of the laws 
they were created to protect. Indeed, last year Yushenkov brought several copies 
to Russia of the (now infamous) "Berezovsky tape" alleging that the security 
services were behind the bombings which had been used as the pretext to start 
the second Chechen war, but none of the media aired the video. (UNITED 
PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 11 Mar 02 via AOL) Moreover, he certainly was not 
the only person to share, or distribute, that tape. 
 
Yushenkov was the most credible, to be sure, but even that credibility shouldn’t 
have proven too dangerous, as most observers in the West seem to have 
stopped (if they had ever started) caring about allegations of FSB wrongdoing. 
His appearance in Washington, DC in April 2002 to discuss the tape garnered 
little attention. The same can be said about a letter Yushenkov wrote to UK 
Foreign Minister Jack Straw that same month, charging FSB abuse of power in 
the Grigory Pasko case. 
 
Yet, while Western officials paid little attention to the deputy, officials in Moscow 
apparently were noticing. Shortly after the assassination, Pasko, who worked 
with Yushenkov upon his release from prison earlier this year, told a reporter 
from the Bellona Foundation of his suspicions. "I would like to remind here that 
FSB Major General Alexander Mikhailov threatened Sergei Yushenkov directly 
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on television, in the talk show Poedinok (Duel). Everyone saw and heard the 
general saying: ‘Mr. Yushenkov, we will take care of you later on.’" 
(PRAVDA.RU, 24 Apr 03 via english.pravda.ru) 
 
It is unlikely that a presidential connection exists to the assassination, but there is 
cause to doubt a complete lack of governmental involvement. The liberal 
democrat may have become a thorn in Putin’s side, but he was only a small 
thorn, surely not irritating enough to warrant removal. However, the recent results 
of the investigation certainly have delivered a one-two punch to one side of the 
political spectrum, and may serve to silence those pesky rumors around the 1999 
bombings. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Maolmordha McGowan 
 
You are all under arrest 
The Federal Security Service, the General Procurator's office, and the Internal 
Security Main Directorate of the Ministry of Interior joined forces on the morning 
of 23 June to execute a major anti-corruption strike, Interior Minister Boris 
Gryzlov reported on 24 June. Among those arrested were six colonels of the 
Moscow Crime Police and the chief of the Internal Security Directorate of the 
Emergency Ministry, Lieutenant General Vladimir Ganeev. The group allegedly 
specialized in extortion from casinos, restaurants, and trading houses, pressuring 
their targets into hiring a certain private security firm and into donating to their 
Social Protection Fund for Criminal Police Veterans. Refusal resulted in 
harassment and, in at least one reported case, the murder of those who resisted. 
Investigators also claim that the gang operated a small arms workshop, and that 
the weapons produced there were used in contract killings, including the murder 
of Duma Deputy and co-chairman of the Liberal Russia party, Sergei Yushenkov. 
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(VREMYA NOVOSTEI, 24 Jun 03 via Lexis-Nexis. See also NIS Observed 18 
Jun 03) 
 
Later in the week, officers representing the same three security services detained 
Liberal Russia Party co-chairman, Mikhail Kodanev, and his former aide, 
Alexander Vinnik, in the town of Kudymkar. (ITAR-TASS, 26 Jun 03 via Lexis-
Nexis) Days prior to the announcement, the suspected triggermen identified by 
Gryzlov only as Kulachinskiy and Kiselev, were arrested in Kodanev’s home city 
of Syktyvkar. (ITAR-TASS, 26 Jun 03 via Lexis-Nexis) According to Gryzlov, 
Kulachinskiy confessed to shooting Yushenkov and claimed that Kiselev was his 
getaway driver. (MOSCOW TIMES, 27 Jun 03 via Lexis-Nexis) Gryzlov is 
expected to argue that the two acted under orders from Mikhail Kodanev passed 
along by Alexander Vinnik. 
 
At first, Gryzlov refused to give any background or reasons for the apprehension 
of Kodanev and Vinnik. An official at the General Procurator's office seemed 
unable to describe what Kodanev’s part, if any, might have been in the 
Yushenkov case, instead making the peculiar assertion that "after he is 
questioned, his role will become clear." (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 26 Jun 03 
via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Kodanev is the co-chairman of the pro-Berezovsky faction of the Liberal Russia 
party [Liberal Russia II (LRII), as Berezovsky calls it] and was hand-picked by the 
self-exiled tycoon to be his lone co-chairman and envoy. LRII was created shortly 
after Yushenkov’s murder and has since attempted to outmaneuver Yushenkov’s 
ally and LRI co-chairman Viktor Pokhmelkin, for control of Liberal Russia. 
Pokhmelkin vowed to bring their dispute to the Justice Ministry, which approved 
LRI’s application for eligibility in the December elections. (NEZAVISIMAYA 
GAZETA, 12 May 03 via Lexis-Nexis) Pokhmelkin’s appeal to the Justice Ministry 
may become unnecessary given the arrest of his rival. 
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Kodanev and Vinnik were officially charged on 2 July with "assassination by 
collusion with a group." Vinnik was rumored to have confessed while being 
questioned by General Procurator's office investigator Igor Myasnikov. Vinnik’s 
lawyer Oleg Komarov, insisted his client would not have confessed and 
suggested that if he had, then he must have been drugged by investigators. The 
General Procurator's office refused to comment on the reported confession. 
(MOSCOW TIMES, 02 July 03via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Kodanev apparently anticipated his arrest in connection with the murder and 
defended himself, preemptively, to reporters via telephone in the moments before 
the FSB arrived. He labeled any allegations that might be brought against him as 
"provocations" by pro-Kremlin forces and Pokhemlkin’s LRI faction. Members of 
both sides of Liberal Russia, however, concede that Vinnik has had connections 
with organized crime and that he did use direct threats to assure that Kodanev 
was elected co-chairman of LRII. (VREMYA NOVOSTEI, 26 Jun 03 via Lexis-
Nexis) 
 
Boris Berezovsky himself recruited high-profile defense lawyer Henry Reznik to 
defend Kodanev. Reznik at first declined citing personal reasons, but after 
revealing that he had been threatened anonymously into declining the case, he 
decided to accept it as a challenge on 2 July. As Reznik takes up the defense, 
some factors in his favor: Gryzlov’s case rests on the alleged confession of 
Kulachinskiy, who has not yet been connected either to the supposed murder 
weapon or to Kodanev; Kulachinskiy’s record as a repeat drug offender may also 
raise doubts about his confession, as well as his susceptibility to police pressure. 
 
Prosecutors will use the fact that Yushenkov was killed just hours after LRI 
registered with the Justice Ministry to stand in the December elections as the 
primary motive for Kodanev, who could have seen Yushenkov as an obstacle 
and rival to his political future. 
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On the other hand, the timing of Kodanev’s arrest adds fuel to the fire of criticism 
of the Putin administration. The arrest came shortly before Kodanev was to 
speak as the lone dissenter against the administration’s planned merger of the 
Perm Region with Komi-Permyak Autonomous Oblast, with Kodanev claiming 
that this further centralization would create a Kremlin-dominated society. (EKHO 
MOSKVY RADIO, 26 Jun 03 via BBC World Monitoring) Needless to say, no one 
will be hearing Kodanev’s speech any time soon. 
 
The idea of rampant corruption in the Russian security services and its 
connection to hired assassinations should raise few eyebrows, but the arrests of 
high-profile perpetrators may come as a surprise. Whether the police crackdown 
constitutes a concerted effort to root out organized crime, or simply an election 
year stunt put on by United Russia leader, Boris Gryzlov, remains to be seen. It 
does not, however, seem to be a coincidence that two founding fathers of United 
Russia and potential rivals of Gryzlov, Yuri Luzhkov and Sergei Shoigu, both lost 
subordinatesto the corruption investigation (Luzhkov through the Moscow Crime 
Police and Shoigu by association with the Emergencies Ministry). It would be 
hard to label Kodanev’s arrest as a coincidence as well, as it amounts to another 
silenced opponent of the Putin regime, the latest in a growing list of Putin critics 
to be hushed, one way or another. 
 
And so are all of you 
In another media splash last month, the Putin administration’s campaign against 
terrorism declared a new victory, as headlines across the nation told of a major 
crackdown on an Islamist group in Moscow. On 6 June, the Federal Security 
Service and the Ministry of the Interior detained 121 terror suspects in a sweep of 
a large bakery, Interior Ministry spokesman Sergei Ignatchenko announced on 9 
June. Ignatchenko said that 55 of the arrested were activists of the Central Asia-
based Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir, (Islamic Revival Party or IRP) and that the 
bakery was their base of operations for the Moscow area. (VREMYA 
NOVOSTEY, 10 Jun 03 via Lexis-Nexis) Among the detained was the alleged 
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leader of the Moscow cell, who used a passport lost by a Kyrgyz citizen to gain 
entry into Russia under the name Alisher Musayev, according to a source in the 
Kyrgyz National Security Service. (ITAR-TASS, 10 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0611 
via World News Connection) A suspected leading IRP activist, Akram Dzhalolov 
of Tajikistan, was also arrested. According to the MVD, the two were in 
possession of plastic explosives, grenades, TNT, propaganda leaflets, and two 
detonators. (ITAR-TASS, 09 Jul 03 via Lexis-Nexis) Ignatchenko called the men 
"Muslim brothers" of al-Qaeda and said that they were readying for possible 
terrorist attacks on Moscow. (THE WASHINGTON POST 10 Jun 03 via Lexis-
Nexis) 
 
While Russia and several other Central Asian states have banned the IRP, 
branding it a terrorist organization, many western states have hesitated, citing 
claims by the group that it rejects violence. (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 2 Jul 
03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
The security services sweep may also have cast too wide a net in this instance: 
Vitaly Ponomaryov, Memorial Human Rights Center’s coordinator for Central 
Asia, at a news conference on 24 June that 66 of those apprehended were 
merely immigrant workers in the bakery and that they were released almost 
immediately. Of the 55 actually accused of being activists in, the IRP, 47 were 
released after being identified and photographed (some were forced to line up 
against a wall in their underwear). Six more released the following day were 
never interrogated about their activities by the FSB or MVD. (THE ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, 25 Jun 03 via www.TheMoscowTimes.com) The only two remaining in 
custody are Musayev and Dzhalolov, who were charged with illegally carrying the 
aforementioned explosives. 
 
Perhaps the massive round up served only to minimize public scrutiny over the 
MVD’s cases against those two. Dzhalolov’s lawyer, Vladimir Chumak, 
suggested to an AP reporter that the explosives were planted during the arrest 
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when Dzhalolov was made to identify his bed and personal items to agents and 
was then forced to leave the room. Chumak has also denied that Dzhalolov and 
Musayev have connections to the IRP. (THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, 25 Jun 03 
via www.theMoscowTimes.com) 
 
It appears that Dzhalolov and Musayev may have been the targets from the 
beginning, as they were alleged to be the highest ranking members of the IRP in 
Moscow. Tajikistan will discuss extradition of Dzhalolov with Russia in line with 
the bilateral arrangements between their security services, according to deputy 
secretary of Tajikistan's Security Council, Mirzovatan Khasanaliyev. (ITAR-TASS, 
14 Jun 03 via Lexis-Nexis) The IRP has also been the target of a ruthless 
crackdown by President Islam Karimov, whose secular regime has been 
challenged by the IRP in a bid to overthrow Karimov’s government by mass 
public support. (THE WASHINGTON POST, 10 Jun 02 via Lexis-Nexis) It is 
plausible that the whole affair therefore was an attempt to curry favor with those 
Central Asian countries most threatened by the IRP. 
 
Of course, one can imagine that the chance to round up over one hundred 
individuals on charges of terrorism was a tempting PR ploy for the FSB and 
MVD. In fact, the MVD barely had time to announce the arrest of 121 "terrorists" 
before releasing 119 of them – no questions asked. This seeming fiasco may 
well have resulted from the brainchild of some aspiring officials in the security 
services looking to pad their resumes in lieu of actual counter-terrorism 
successes. However, it seems more likely that the arrests, like the 
aforementioned police corruption crackdown, are simply an election year bid to 
boost public support for Boris Gryzlov’s United Russia Party in time for the Duma 
elections, and by association emphasize the Putin administration’s handling of 
internal security. For this case, at least, the fact remains that with no witnesses to 
corroborate the claims of the FSB and MVD, there is little reason for the people 
of Russia to feel protected by their security services from terrorist threats. This 
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incident suggests that the FSB and MVD are either wasting their time providing 
an illusion of security, or recklessly handling real threats to the Federation. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Nadezda Kinsky 
 
UKRAINE 
No Rest for the Opposition 
Yuliya Tymoshenko has not been having an easy time of it this summer. When 
she is not having to worry about the criminal charges brought against her, which 
were dropped in May only for that verdict to be immediately overturned by the 
Prosecutor General's Office, she has to concern herself with the rather unsteady 
state of the opposition coalition, which is still struggling to get off the ground for 
the presidential race next year. 
 
The Kiev appeals court ruled on May 13 to close the embezzlement and tax 
evasion cases against Yuliya Tymoshenko, her husband, and four former 
managers of the United Energy Systems of Ukraine corporation. On May 22, 
calling the supporting papers a forgery, the Prosecutor General's Office began 
criminal proceedings against the court. Now, the Kiev appeals court is attempting 
to hit back at the Prosecutor General's Office by filing an appeal against it with 
the Supreme Council of Parliament: "We request the Supreme Council 
committee on legislative support for law-enforcement activities to consider the 
situation caused by the violation of the criminal case and gross interference by 
the Prosecutor-General's Office in the administration of justice by judges of the 
Kiev Region Court of Appeal and to take an appropriate decision" (Interfax 
Ukraine, 4 Jul 03; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis). 
 
Much has been made, particularly within her own bloc, of the political pressure 
imposed on Yuliya Tymoshenko by the court proceedings, and specifically of 
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what they have called the unlawful pre-trial imprisonments of Tymoshenko's 
father-in-law Hennadiy Tymoshenko and Antoninya Bolyura. They were re-
arrested when the prosecutor-general occasioned the re-opening of the case in 
late May. However, the Prosecutor General's Office let it be known on July 4 that 
Kiev's Shevchenkivskyy district court found that their pre-trial detention was 
entirely lawful. It is clear that the political and legal pressure on Yuliya 
Tymoshenko will not be reduced in the near future. 
 
The opposition faction leader is also continuing to have difficulties with the 
planned cooperation between her own bloc and the other opposition factions in 
the run-up to the presidential elections. While President Leonid Kuchma is 
continuing to clear the path for himself to either try to extend his term or stand for 
reelection, or at least to secure his options and personal safety once a new 
president is in power, the opposition still fails to convey the impression of a 
coordinated movement dedicated to its cause. Yushchenko, though still leading 
the polls, might begin to stumble on his own indecision and the disorder that is 
unfolding in his Our Ukraine faction. A harsh critique of the crumbling façade of 
Yushchenko's Our Ukraine Bloc was published by the weekly Zerkalo Nedeli (7 
Jun 03 via Lexis-Nexis). While Yushchenko and Yuliya Tymoshenko have 
experienced great difficulty finding common cause, given their many open 
political differences, Yushchenko has also had trouble reaching agreements even 
with many members in his own faction. Tymoshenko continues to call on 
Yushchenko for coalition negotiations, a call that does not seem to be getting 
very far. The opposition factions are all politically far apart, and their obvious 
distrust and political differences are showing. Tymoshenko's suggestion that 
parliamentary posts had to be decided before fielding a single candidate was 
immediately dismissed by Yushchenko. Communist Party leader Piotr 
Symonenko was one of the opposition candidates saying that in the absence of a 
coordinated political view and agreement on a single program, there was no 
possibility of fielding a single candidate. Symonenko has ruled out any 
cooperation with the Our Ukraine Bloc, but has claimed that he believes the 
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Communist Party has a realistic chance of winning in the presidential election if 
they cooperate with Yuliya Tymoshenko's Bloc and the Socialist Bloc (2000, 13 
Jun 03 via Lexis-Nexis). The longer these discussions go on, the less likely is a 
successful cooperation between the opposition parties, and public faith in that 
cooperation. Opposition leaders not only are running out of time and talking 
themselves into a deadlock, but more importantly this indecision and inability to 
cooperate may be a sign of things to come after the election that would neither 
bode well nor inspire trust in a lasting cooperation. 
 
BELARUS 
Whose independence? 
On July 3, Belarus celebrated Independence Day. In several speeches and a 
televised interview, Lukashenka gave his views on the state of Belarus, 
Belarussian political and social situations, and the independence it has attained 
in the last decade and how that will be sustained in the current international 
environment and particularly with respect to union plans with Russia. His main 
comments on the subjects of the day were given in a speech to WWII veterans 
on the eve of the holiday, and in one televised interview with Belarussian state 
television STV, broadcast on Jun 30. The speech he delivered to veterans was 
broadcast on Belarussian radio and given - uncharacteristically for the largely 
Russian-speaking president - in Belarussian. 
 
Lukashenka concentrated on an already well-known group of topics in his 
appearances. He praised Belarussian independence and the central role he 
perceives for it in the CIS and indeed Europe. He defined for Belarus a spiritual 
role that it carries as the holder of Eastern European civilization: "This role could 
be easily claimed and played by Russia, and it is claiming it. Ukraine could also 
play this role as the cradle of our civilization. But it is White Russia (another 
name for Belarus), pure and unblemished, that has happened to be at the 
forefront. I guess it is destiny" (STV, 30 Jun 03; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis). 
According to its President, independent Belarus is showing the best and most 
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lasting successes in matters of economy and social provision among the CIS: 
"People gravitate to our Belarus not only due to its clean streets but also due to 
unsullied relations between the people, humanity, openness, benevolence and 
compassion" (Belarusian Radio, 2 Jul 03 BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis). 
 
In international matters, Lukashenka attempted to tread a middle path at once 
criticizing Russia and distancing himself from it. On July 1, he unexpectedly and 
suddenly withdrew the Belarussian agreement from the currency union 
agreement between Russia and Belarus, which had been signed in June. 
According to this treaty, July 1 was to be the day on which the first step towards 
currency unification was to begin, with Russian rubles becoming legal tender for 
Belarussian non-cash transactions. Despite his having signed the treaty himself, 
Lukashenka withdrew his agreement on the grounds that the treaty allegedly 
violated the Belarussian constitution (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 1 Jul 03 via 
Lexis-Nexis). Accordingly, in his TV and radio appearances, the President 
underlined the need for union with Russia when speaking about distancing 
Belarus from the West and NATO, but simultaneously defended his decision that 
any union between Russian and Belarus would have to be, and would be, "a two-
way street, rather than the incorporation of one nation into the other. The loss of 
sovereignty is out of the question. Unification will only proceed on a fair and 
equal basis" (Belarusian Radio, 2 Jul 03; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis). 
 
He also criticized heavily what he perceives as Russian pressure on Belarus via 
the mass media: "I will put it bluntly: the pressure is currently being put on 
Belarus through the use of weapons of mass destruction, there is no other name 
for them, that is, the mass media. The mass media are weapons of mass 
destruction today, the most powerful ones" (STV, 30 Jun 03; BBC Monitoring via 
Lexis-Nexis). The Russian media that are available in Belarus are the only media 
organs in the country that are not state-controlled and hence do not solely serve 
the President's views. Belarussian authorities have increasingly been putting 
pressure on Russian media to leave the Belarussian media landscape. In the 
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latest such moves, NTV reporter Pavel Selin was expelled from Belarus for 
disseminating "distortion and false information" on July 1 - a move that also 
resulted in the closure of NTV's office in Belarus. Selin had broadcast and 
commented upon the funeral of writer Vassyl Bykov, including the airing of acts 
of resistance to the Lukashenka regime by those attending the funeral in the form 
of speeches and by displays of the forbidden national flag of Belarus (Deutsche 
Presse-Agentur, 1 Jul 03 via Lexis-Nexis). 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
CHECHNYA 
Coerced return 
"Despite the deteriorating security situation in Chechnya, the forced return of 
IDPs in Ingushetia has already begun," said Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) 
director for Chechnya and Ingushetia, Mr. Gabriel Trujilo in testimony to the US 
Congress Helsinki Commission on 10 June, 2003. 
 
Russian authorities are redoubling efforts to force the refugees in Ingushetia to 
return to Chechnya. Such measures include threats and intimidation, conducting 
"cleansings" in Ingushetia, squeezing international NGOs out of the region and 
making Ingushetia as inhospitable to refugees as the conflict zone proper. 
 
In February, MSF conducted a survey of 3,209 Chechen families living in 8 
refugee camps in Ingushetia. This represents 16,499 persons and all but 39 
families who live in the camps. Of the respondents, 98% percent did not want to 
return to Chechnya and 93% said that they did not want to return because they 
feared for their security. ("Left Without A Choice: Chechens forced to return to 
Chechnya," MSF Press Release, April 2003) The camps represent only a small 
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fraction (roughly 18%) of all the Chechen IDPs in Ingushetia, since most have 
settled in "spontaneous settlements" or are staying in private homes. 
 
Situation deteriorating 
Two events this weekend demonstrate that security in Russia is deteriorating. 
Two suicide bombers in Moscow claimed at least 13 lives when they detonated 
explosives outside a rock festival on 5 July. On the same day an AFP reporter 
was kidnapped in Ingushetia. 
 
These events show that the war has failed to attain the two goals it was launched 
ostensibly to accomplish: to stop terrorism and to put an end to the hostage 
trade. Four years into the war, terrorists and kidnappers have only expanded 
their theater of operations. 
 
On 12 August 2002 Arjan Erkel, an MSF volunteer was abducted in Makhachkala 
and remains missing. In March 2003 Ibrahim Zayzikov, a humanitarian relief 
worker with the Czech foundation, People in Need, was abducted in Ingushetia. 
In May, Russian authorities assured MSF that Arjan Erkel is alive, but "where he 
is being held, who abducted him and for what reason remains a mystery." 
According to MSF, the unwillingness of the Russian government to tackle the 
case amounts to "the obstruction of Arjan's release." (MSF press releases 07 
Mar and 12 May 03). 
 
At present, there are no foreign humanitarian aid workers in Chechnya and 
increasingly Ingushetia too is becoming off-limits to foreign staff. Speaking to 
RFE/RL on June 20, Gabriel Trujillo, head of the MSF mission to Chechnya and 
Ingushetia and Patrice Page, the MSF liaison to the United Nations, recounted 
how the federal and Ingush authorities obstruct their efforts, making it impossible 
for international staff to conduct visits to Chechnya and forcing the MSF to 
relocate its mission from Nazran to Nalchik. ("MSF: No Right to Refuge for 
Chechens," RFE/RL 25 Jun 03) The "remote control" from Nalchik indicates that 
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the Chechen war is particularly dangerous for foreigners even in comparison with 
Africa, where recent wars have claimed millions of lives. "I've worked in Sudan 
and Liberia, our experts were there; why in this war zone are we not able to 
work? We know how to work in a war zone," said Page. 
 
UNHCR Report on Chechnya 
Western governments have chosen to pretend that Russia's sham political 
process provides improvement for the security situation in and around Chechnya 
but international bodies have documented the opposite. The UNHCR found that 
Chechen IDPs are routinely denied freedom of movement, were welcomed only 
in Ingushetia, and are now being evicted from there. The document urges that 
Chechen asylum-seekers should not be returned to Russia. The key findings of 
the report "UNHCR Paper on Asylum Seekers from the Russian Federation in the 
Context of the Situation in Chechnya – February 2003," which unfortunately has 
not received wide circulation, are summarized below. 
 
The report found that: 
"Guerrilla activities have intensified in the zones officially under the control of the 
Russian Federation forces. (…) Government military operations in civilian areas, 
where rebels are suspected to be in hiding, regularly lead to new displacement of 
populations, both within Chechnya as well as to Ingushetia…." (Paragraph 7, 
Article b) 
 
"The situation in the TAC (Temporary Accommodation Centers in Chechnya) 
remains precarious: sanitation is below acceptable standards with latrines 
located outside buildings in insufficient numbers and non-accessible after 
curfew." (Paragraph 7, Article e) 
 
"Security incidents in Ingushetia, in Dagestan, in North Ossetia-Alania 
(Vladikavkaz) and in Karachai-Cherkessia (Cherkess) give rise to the fear that 
guerrilla activity might expand to neighboring republics." (Paragraph 7, Article k) 
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"Several hundreds of returnees were unable to remain in Chechnya, primarily for 
reasons of security and harassment, as well as for lack of shelter and 
infrastructure, and returned to Ingushetia." (Paragraph 7, Article l) 
 
"Access to humanitarian agencies and humanitarian agencies access to the 
population inside Chechnya has been hampered by security constraints" and 
arbitrary administrative measures. (Paragraph 7, Article n) 
 
"Security for aid workers has deteriorated." (Paragraph 7, Article o) 
 
The report found that ethnic Chechens were routinely denied the status of "forced 
migrant," which would entitle them to assistance and restitution. In fact, in 
Ingushetia only 89 persons have been granted forced migrant status. (Paragraph 
r14) Only one person has been able to obtain restitution for the destruction of 
property and that pertained to the 1994 – 1996 war. (Paragraph 18) 
 
Chechens are routinely denied freedom of movement and harassed by the 
police. The Soviet "propiska" system has been replaced by the so-called 
"registration" which can be either permanent or temporary. In practice, 
permanent registration is needed to obtain basic services legally, such as 
healthcare and education and in practice this is denied to Chechen IDPs. Thus, 
Chechen IDPs can not move outside Ingushetia, where their existence remains 
highly precarious. "While officially adopting the position of voluntary return, the 
authorities have actively pursued a policy of inducing IDPs to return to Chechnya. 
This policy has been particularly pursued in the Republic of Ingushetia, where the 
majority of the IDPs are located." ( Paragraph 25) 
 
The UNHCR found that "Legislative mechanisms and related assistance that 
would facilitate the settlement of IDPs beyond Chechnya and Ingushetia are not 
available." (Paragraph 77) 
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"In other administrative districts of the Russian Federation, the combination of 
local restrictive regulations on freedom of movement and freedom of choice or 
place of sojourn/residence, anti-Chechen feelings among the public, and 
concerns among local authorities to contain ethnic tensions and to prevent 
terrorist acts, deprives Chechen IDPs of a genuine internal relocation 
alternative." ( Article 79) 
 
"For these reasons the UNHCR would strongly advise against considering 
Ingushetia as a reasonable relocation alternative for ethnic Chechen asylum-
seekers originating from Chechnya." (Article 85) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Joel Hafvenstein 
 
TURKMENISTAN 
One nation under Niyazov 
The 22 June deadline for dual Turkmen-Russian citizens to choose which 
passport they would keep arrived amidst a storm of controversy. (See NIS 
OBSERVED, 18 Jun 03) The Russian Duma continued to insist that the 1993 
citizenship agreement between Russia and Turkmenistan must remain in force 
unless and until a revised protocol is duly ratified by the parliaments of both 
countries. As a point of international law, President Saparmurat "Turkmenbashi" 
Niyazov has every right to revoke unilaterally his state’s former citizenship policy; 
in reality, of course, Russia’s continued insistence on the dual citizenship for 
Russians counts for a great deal. 
 
The citizenship issue has provided an occasion for the Duma's direct involvement 
in foreign policy. On 19 June, the Duma international affairs committee placed 
Turkmenistan on the list of countries which Russian citizens are advised to avoid 
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(the first CIS country ever so listed); the following day, the full Duma voted near-
unanimously on an unprecedented direct rebuke to Ashgabat, accusing Niyazov 
of violating human rights and "insulting… the honor and dignity of Russian 
citizens." (INTERFAX, 1220 GMT, 19 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0619 and 
INTERFAX, 0907 GMT, 20 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0620 via World News 
Connection) Niyazov responded by accusing various Russian media and 
politicians of slander – notably Dmitri Rogozin, head of the Duma international 
affairs committee, who has done the most to stir public outrage at the Turkmen 
situation. Two days later, the citizenship deadline arrived and passed with no 
formal abdications of Russian citizenship and few repudiations of Turkmen 
citizenship. (ITAR-TASS, 1202 GMT, 24 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0624 via World 
News Connection) 
 
President Putin claims to have come to an understanding with Niyazov that the 
22 June deadline applies only to future dual citizenship applications, while the 
status of existing dual citizens will be decided by a soon-to-meet bilateral 
commission. (ITAR-TASS, 1827 GMT, 20 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0620 via 
World News Connection) However, Niyazov has publicly stated no such thing, 
and his understanding of "existing dual citizens" differs in some important ways 
from Putin’s: The Turkmen Foreign Ministry maintains that only 47 people 
legitimately possess dual citizenship in Turkmenistan. The Russian Embassy in 
Ashgabat, by contrast, claims to have issued more than 2,600 exit visas and 
registered 95,000 individuals as former dual citizens. (TIMES OF CENTRAL 
ASIA, 2 Jul 03 via www.times.kg and INTERFAX, 1459 GMT, 24 Jun 03; FBIS-
SOV-2003-0624 via World News Connection) 
 
The first two weeks after the deadline have been fairly quiet. Property rights of 
former dual citizens are the main initial concern; the Moscow media have issued 
thus far unconfirmed reports of Russians being evicted from their apartments. 
(INTERFAX, 0627 GMT, 27 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0627 via World News 
Connection) However, the stage is possibly being set for a broader crackdown. 
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Three days after the deadline, the government of Turkmenistan announced that 
the State Service for Registration of Foreign Citizens (a body created in March) 
had been newly empowered to conduct operational investigations on the same 
basis as the police and security agencies. The new agency’s duties include 
"oversight of the observation of Turkmen laws by foreigners during their stay in 
the country;" it comprises units in major urban areas and border checkpoints, and 
will maintain a database of information on all citizens. (INTERFAX, 1517 GMT, 
25 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0625 via World News Connection) This added fuel to 
the Duma’s fear that Niyazov would assign special security forces to track and 
harass former Russian citizens. 
 
Ironically, the growing vulnerability of Russians in Turkmenistan has provided the 
occasion for several vigorous and overt declarations of Russian hegemony in the 
region. In defending his committee against Niyazov’s ire, Rogozin stated that 
Russia "has the full right to act as the protector of human and civil rights 
throughout the former Soviet Union" – not limiting himself even to the protection 
of Russian citizens’ rights. (INTERFAX, 1616 GMT, 17 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
0617 via World News Connection) Other nations in the region would do well to 
watch the outcome of this standoff. 
 
TAJIKISTAN AND KYRGYZSTAN 
Consolidating presidential power 
Elsewhere in Central Asia on 22 June, Tajiks went to the polls for a long-
anticipated referendum on a package of constitutional amendments. The 
amendments included such important technocratic details as an extension of 
judicial terms and the introduction of fees for health care and education. Another 
amendment, much emphasized by government spokesmen as a consolidation of 
democracy, collapses the old official classification of parties ("religious," 
"democratic," and "atheistic") into a single, general "political party" category. 
(EURASIANET, 18 Mar 03 via www.times.kg) This further normalizes Tajikistan’s 
Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), the only legal Islamic party in ex-Soviet Central 
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Asia. However, the most salient amendment was that to Article 65 of the 
Constitution, expanding presidential term limits from one to two seven-year 
terms. (EURASIANET, 20 Apr 03 via www.times.kg) 
 
The sitting President, Emomali Rahmonov, won his first term in 1994 during the 
thick of Tajikistan’s civil war. In 1999, just before the next presidential elections, a 
constitutional amendment expanded the presidential term to seven years, but 
limited the president to a single term. Rahmonov won the 1999 election, arguing 
that the single-term rule began in 1999 with the amendment to the constitution 
and did not apply to the five-year term he had already served. If he once again 
argues that new constitutional amendments mean new rules and a cleaning of 
his slate — an argument supported by the text of the new amendment, and 
already being rehearsed by his supporters in parliament — Rahmonov could run 
for two more_terms under the new constitutional rules. 
 
The opposition is generally livid at this prospect, though the IRP has agreed to 
take part in the vote "for stability’s sake." Several groups boycotted the 
referendum, insisting that Rahmonov had already had his two terms; others 
called on Rahmonov to explicitly declare that the amendment to Article 65 would 
not apply to him. No such assurances were forthcoming, and on 22 June, the 
package of amendments passed with a purported 93% "Yes" vote. The 
Democratic Party of Tajikistan accused the government of ballot-stuffing, 
estimating that turnout was closer to 20% than to the 96% registered by election 
officials (or the 53% required to validate the referendum). (INTERFAX, 0914 
GMT, 23 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0623 via World News Connection) 
 
These estimates can be neither confirmed nor denied by international observer 
agencies, which (in a pattern familiar from other referenda in the region) were 
invited to monitor the ballot mere weeks before the vote. The UN and OSCE both 
declined on the grounds that they lacked time to prepare a proper observer 
mission. Before the referendum, OSCE officials assured journalists that their 
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decision not to monitor the vote was "of a technical rather than political nature 
and will not affect its legitimacy." (INTERFAX, 1416 GMT, 20 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-
2003-0620 via World News Connection) Afterward, however, a published OSCE 
statement suggested that the turnout of 96% was suspiciously high, and 
expressed regret that the opposition was not given adequate opportunities to air 
its views. (INTERFAX, 0941 GMT, 25 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0625 via World 
News Connection) Rahmonov, for his part, bluntly stated, "It is the people who 
vote for the Constitution, not international observers." Russian diplomats 
emphatically agreed that the referendum was a "purely internal affair," and that 
they would accept whatever results were published by the Tajik government. 
(INTERFAX, 1335 GMT, 23 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0623 and INTERFAX, 0736 
GMT, 22 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0622 via World News Connection) 
 
A similarly flawed referendum took place earlier this year in Kyrgyzstan, in a futile 
effort to bolster President Askar Akaev against opposition criticism. (See NIS 
OBSERVED, 22 Jan and 5 Feb 03) In recent weeks, Akaev has moved to 
consolidate the hypothetical gains from that referendum. His administration 
introduced a bill into the Legislative Assembly which guarantees that when his 
term is up, the "First President of Kyrgyzstan" will receive various perks, a 
generous pension, and (most importantly) immunity from prosecution for any 
actions or omissions while in office. (INTERFAX, 1117 GMT, 26 Jun 03; FBIS-
SOV-2003-0626 and ITAR-TASS, 0959 GMT, 30 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0630 
via World News Connection) Two former first secretaries of the Kyrgyz 
Communist Party were readily given similar guarantees, though the Legislative 
Assembly balked at extending immunity from prosecution to members of Akaev’s 
family. The best that can be said for this law is that it encourages the president to 
leave office when his current (second) term is up in 2005, rather than hanging on 
indefinitely like all the other chief executives in the region. 
 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were the only two newly independent Central Asian 
states not to be dominated by the Soviet-era heads of their respective 
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Communist Parties. Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayev, Uzbekistan’s Karimov, and 
Turkmenistan’s Niyazov have all been centralizing and consolidating executive 
power since their first days in office – by blatantly rigged referenda, among other 
means. Akaev and Rahmonov have had to "catch up" from a position of relative 
pluralism and accountability. Their moves toward autocracy are rightly 
disheartening to those who had hoped to see Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan continue 
in a more democratic direction. 
 
 
Copyright Boston University Trustees 2003 
Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal were written especially for 
Analyst. This article was originally published at http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol8/ed0811.html. 
